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Despite a growing body of research on political society in late medieval Scotland,
and on Anglo-Scottish war, truce, and frontier administration, exactly how local bor-
der society responded to the threat of warfare with England is not well understood.
Source materials lend themselves to analysis of the military careers of great magnate
dynasties,1 but not to an investigation of the roles performed by the lesser nobility of
the borderlands whose fortified residences offered the first line of national defence,
and who constituted that social group which conveyed royal and magnate power in
the localities.2 The late medieval Anglo-Scottish frontier is the subject of two outstand-
ing recent monographs. In 1998, Cynthia Neville examined the development of inter-
national border or ‘march’ law, illuminating the judicial role of those royal officials
known as wardens of the march and truce conservators and the influence on law and
on administration of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy from the thirteenth to the fifteenth
century. Whereas Neville expanded on the legal dimensions of the region’s history,
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especially from an English governmental perspective, in 2000 Alastair J. Macdonald
adopted a Scottish governmental perspective to explain Anglo-Scottish warfare in the
late fourteenth century. Macdonald shows how Anglo-French conflict allowed the
Scottish Crown to pursue a concerted offensive foreign policy towards England,
drawing on wide national participation and relying on cooperation between Crown
and nobility in military campaigns.3 These studies are by no means alone in their
concern with the late medieval Anglo-Scottish frontier, and other work has tended
to focus on warfare, usually from the English viewpoint and mostly concerned with
the fourteenth century.4 This paper offers an examination of the role of the lesser
nobility in Scottish defensive arrangements in the later fifteenth century, when
Scotland faced an English neighbour which was now mostly shorn of its military
preoccupations in France. The Scottish realm was no longer able to sustain the sort
of offensive strategy apparent in the period studied by Macdonald; territory formerly
lost to English control had now been reconquered, and there was far more security
to be had in courting peace. Apart from exploiting English civil strife in the 1460s
(thereby regaining Roxburgh and Berwick-upon-Tweed), Scotland reverted to an
overall strategy of avoiding major military engagements which in some ways resem-
bled that of the early fourteenth century.5 Yet open war was to come again, and a
new generation of leaders had to face the old problem how the Scottish-controlled
border zone, now restored to its pre-1296 dimensions, was to be defended against
major invasion. The following study pays close attention to the preparations for
hostilities with England in 1482, the conflict which is best known for the arrest of
James III at Lauder and for the final loss of Berwick to English control. The rela-
tively detailed evidence brings into clear view the local and regional networks of
power by which Scottish marchers governed and defended themselves and by which
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a ‘periphery’ — albeit not a remote one — was linked directly to the political ‘core’
of the kingdom.
From at least the 1340s, the borderlands were divided into three distinct marches,
each with its own warden, to whom fell the primary responsibility for leadership in
war and for the defence of the fluctuating frontier. Michael Brown’s research has
demonstrated the pre-eminent role of the ‘Black Douglas’ earls of Douglas as wardens
and war-leaders in the reconquest of territory under English domination. In the fif-
teenth century, however, the decrease in warfare with England removed the justifi-
cation for the regional supremacy of the Black Douglases in the marches and allowed
an aggressive James II to drive the dynasty out of the realm in the 1450s. After the fall
of the Douglases, the wardenships were held among a wider range of lords who,
unlike their predecessors who had held the office in heredity, began to draw modest
annual salaries from the Crown, in the range of £133 to £200. Prominent among
these later wardens were the ‘Red Douglas’ earls of Angus, based at Tantallon Castle
on the Lothian coast.6
To defend the border, the wardens needed men to fight. The army of late medieval
Scotland consisted of two elements: first, the feudal levy, which, unlike in England,
remained a major component of the Scottish army into the sixteenth century; and,
second, the common army, in which all men (not already serving in a noble retinue)
between sixteen and sixty years of age were liable to serve. The common army was
drilled by royal sheriffs and the officers of regalian lords who were to hold wappen-
schaws (weapon-showings, or arrays) at least once a year, although the frequency was
increased from time to time.7 Lesser officers known as vinteners — four “worthy
men” in each parish — actually mustered the local forces. It was by this means that
the common army was raised in wartime, upon royal writs issued to summon the host,
upon the ‘cry’ of the warden, or upon the alarm of lit beacons to signal an invasion.8
The common army was primarily a defensive force, to be put at the disposal of the
wardens or a superior royal lieutenant. Service was unpaid, and men had to bear the
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7 RPS, records 1425/3/24, 1426/20, 1430/15-18, 1456/4, 1458/3/7, 1471/5/6, 1481/4/8, 1482/3/44,
1482/12/77, 1484/2/30; Dickinson,“Some Notes on the Scottish Army,” 133-34, 137, 144 n. 10; Bar-
row, “The Army of Alexander III’s Scotland,” passim; Duncan, Scotland, 378-85.
8 TA, I, 49, 269, 337-38, 352-53; TA, IV, 417; RPS, records 1430/34, 38, 44. Cf. APS, I, 714-16, app. IV,
pp. 351-52.
expense of victualling themselves for periods of up to forty days. In 1456, it was felt
necessary to legislate that no poor man (neither his poverty nor the element of the army
in which he served was defined) should be charged to “cum till ony radis in Inglande,”
which implies that men of greater means might be asked to serve outside the realm.9
The best surviving sources for late medieval frontier defence come from parlia-
ment.10 The ancient custom of service in the common army was first subject to legis-
lation in 1318. Thereafter, further enactments regulated the host, chiefly in matters
of behaviour and armament.11 The first evidence for more detailed military statutes
comes from the mid-fifteenth century. In 1448, the earl of Douglas, as warden, held
a council at Lincluden and compiled a set of statutes of the marches in wartime,
which were an elaboration of parliamentary legislation on the same subject dating
from 1430. Following the Crown’s elimination of the Black Douglases, parliament
passed further laws for war in 1455-1456. All of these more extended regulations
were especially concerned with obedience, punishment for assisting the enemy, and
the handling of prisoners and ransoms.12 While they form, in part, a competitive dia-
logue over the military authority of the Crown and the Black Douglas dynasty,13 they
also reflect a sharpening focus on defensive organization.
It is the Scottish parliament’s war measures laid down in the spring of 1482 that
provide the clearest view of arrangements for frontier defence in the fifteenth century.
The political circumstances of conflict in the period from 1480 to 1482 may be briefly
summarized: strong Anglo-Scottish rapprochement had led to a truce extension in
1474, its preamble expressing concern for the wealth and prosperity of “this Nobill
Ile, callit Gret Britanee.”14 Over the next five years two marriages were planned between
the families of Edward IV and James III.15 Yet shifting European diplomatic alignments
meant good relations collapsed in 1479, the same year when James drove into exile
his brother Alexander, duke of Albany and earl of March, who was also one of the war-
dens. Anglo-Scottish raiding by sea and land occurred in 1480-1481, and, by March
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9 RPS, record 1456/4. I am grateful to Aly Macdonald for discussion on this point.
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11 RPS, records 1318/6-7, 22, 26, 29; 1385/6/4.
12 APS, I, 714-16, app. IV, pp. 351-52; RPS, records 1430/32-53, 1455/10/2a-15; 1456/2-5, 12.
13 Brown, The Black Douglases, 276-77.
14 Foedera, V, iii, 48.
15 RPS, records 1475/35; Foedera, V, iii, 22, 48-51, 75, 123, 126; Rot. Scot., II, 429, 443-45, 456-57.
1482, the Scottish government was expecting a major invasion led in person by the
“revare Edward.” Indeed, in late July, the duke of Gloucester, the earl of Northumber-
land, and the exiled Albany (now claiming the Scottish throne for himself) crossed
the border with an English army of considerable size, possibly as large as 20,000 men.
On 22 July, a coup at Lauder seized James III as he assembled the Scottish host, its lead-
ers allowing the army to disband, thus averting a full-scale battle. The king was taken
to Edinburgh Castle and detained there. The invaders marched to Edinburgh in early
August, Albany negotiated a compromise for his return to Scotland, and the English
army returned south, capturing Berwick by the end of the month.16
These events raise three main questions: first, what shape did the Scottish war
measures take, and what were their objectives; second, who led these preparations, and
what was their relationship to the Lauder conspirators; and third, what do these
measures reveal about local society in the Scottish marches towards England?
The preparations enacted before the invasion of 1482 were highly specific. Par-
liament, which sat for ten days from 18 to 28 March, ordered the frequency of wap-
penschaws to be raised to once every fifteen days and the coastline to be divided into
six-mile (9.7 km) stretches, each under the watch of a captain “to gadir the cuntre and
to awayte thareuppoune quhen thare is na grete hoistingis be land.”17 However, a
land attack was anticipated. While the king undertook to pay for a garrison of five hun-
dred soldiers to defend Berwick for three months from the first day of June, the estates
agreed to pay for a further six hundred “wageouris” to garrison other castles and
towers for three months from the first day of May. Thus, during June and July, a total
of 1,100 hired “men of were” were positioned along the border, half of them spear-
men and half of them archers.18 This was unusual in that these fighting men, sepa-
rate from the common and feudal levies of the army, were to be waged. They received
a very reasonable rate of 2s 6d a day for each spear, and 2s a day for each bow, amount-
ing to a projected outlay exceeding £11,000 Scots currency.19 By comparison, English
bowmen in the 1470s commanded a rate of 6d English currency a day. Calculating
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16 RPS, record 1482/3/44 (quotation); Macdougall, James III (1982), chaps. 7, 8, and App. A, p. 312;
Nicholson, Scotland, 475-80, 487-514, esp. 490-94, 497; Tanner, “‘I Arest You, Sir’,” 115; Ross,
Edward IV, 278-95.
17 RPS, record 1482/3/44.
18 RPS, record 1482/3/44. Macdougall, James III (1982), 149-50 and 161.
19 That is, £11,137 10s 0d Scots (£5,062 10s paid by the king, and £6,075 paid by the estates). This
assumes 90 days’ service and the same rate of pay for the estates’ and the king’s troops. See Nichol-
son, Scotland, 494.
at an exchange rate of 1:3.5, the Scottish archers were taking at least as much as their
English counterparts could expect to be paid.20
No mounted troops were provided since, apparently, they were already abun-
dant. Landed men serving in the feudal levy were expected to be well-horsed accord-
ing to their means, thus comprising a heavy cavalry. Lesser men might also offer
mounted service in the retinues of local lairds, riding unarmoured hobbies or nags.
The presence of such a numerous light cavalry is suggested by the statute of 1448
which allowed the “chieftain of the host” to restrict the number of mounted troops.
It seems that the additional garrisons of 1482, providing extra archers and spearmen
to guard certain towers, would have concurrently allowed other borderers to serve on
horseback in private retinues.21
Such defensive ordinances and funding from on high were novel. The details of
border defence were normally left to the wardens, as illustrated by the statutes of
1430 and 1448.22 Garrisons had been mentioned only in general terms in the legis-
lation of 1455, and Crown payments for military service were offered only in extra-
ordinary circumstances, like the reimbursement made to Sir Walter Scott for a force
of one hundred Teviotdale men whom he hired to serve the king against the Douglases
in 1452.23 Even in 1481, when parliament had ordered castles on the border and the
coast to be repaired and provisioned, this was to be done at the owners’ expense. Part
of the explanation for the innovations of 1482 is to be found in the proclivities of
James III, for whom the possession of Berwick (which had been regained in 1461, dur-
ing his minority) was an important symbol of Scottish sovereignty.24
The exceptional nature of these ordinances notwithstanding, they are valuable for
the clear picture of Scottish border defence which they afford. They reveal that only
Local Society and the Defence of the English Frontier in Fifteenth-Century Scotland 133
20 PROME, October 1472 (First Roll), item 8; PROME (Third Roll, June 1474-March 1475), item 43.
For exchange rates, see Grant, Independence and Nationhood, 240.
21 RPS, records 1430/15, 16, 33, 47; APS, I, 715, app. IV, 351, item 3. On hobelars, see McNamee, The
Wars of the Bruces, 23-24.
22 APS, I, 714-16, app. IV, pp. 351-52; RPS, records 1430/32-53.
23 RPS, record 1455/10/15; ER, V, 607. Cf. ER, IV, 115 (reimbursement for gaining and demolishing Jed-
burgh, 1409).
24 RPS, records 1481/4/9, 18 (a tax for the victualling of Berwick granted “for the plesance of the kingis
hienes”). Cf. Nicholson, Scotland, 492; Macdougall, James III (1982), 149-50. In 1481, Edrington
(not mentioned in the ordinances of 1482) was also to be victualled. The latter belonged to Robert
Lauder of Edrington, keeper of Berwick from January 1477 till January 1482 (RMS, II, no. 1276, p. 259;
ER, VII, 144, 293, 314, 398, 491, 578; ER, VIII, 118, 119, 188).
a thin strip of land close to the frontier was subject to these additional military
preparations.25 In the east march, two hundred of the soldiers at Berwick were con-
stantly to be at the disposal of the warden, Archibald Douglas, earl of Angus (nick-
named ‘Bell-the-Cat’ in the seventeenth century for his fictionalized role in the
Lauder coup).26 Three eastern strongholds were entrusted to James, the son of
William, Lord Borthwick. As “capitane,” Borthwick was to choose one hundred men,
two “gentilmen” as deputes, and to base himself with sixty soldiers at Hume, while
his deputes were to hold Blackadder and Wedderburn, each with twenty men.27 In
the middle march, where the warden was James Stewart, earl of Buchan, three lairds
were selected as captains. Sir John Edmonstone of that Ilk was to choose one hun-
dred men and two deputes under him and take responsibility for the strongholds of
Cessford, with sixty men, and Ormiston and Edgerston, each holding twenty. John
Cranstoun of that Ilk was likewise to choose one hundred men and two deputes
and to put sixty men in Jedburgh (presumably in the town’s defensive towers) and
a further twenty each in the towers of Cocklaw and Dolphinston.28 Sir William
Baillie of Lamington was given custody of Hermitage Castle in Liddesdale with one
hundred men, chosen as above, to be “redy to support baith the Myddil and the
West Bordouris [i.e., marches] in tyme of nede and as thai salbe warnit and char-
git.”29 In the west march, where John Stewart, Lord Darnley, was the newly-appointed
warden, Thomas Kirkpatrick of Closeburn was made captain of Lochmaben Castle
in Annandale, with one hundred men of his choice.30 The final captaincy went to
Robert Charteris of Amisfield who, with his chosen one hundred men and two
deputes, was to command garrisons of forty each at Castlemilk and the town of
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25 RPS, record 1482/3/44. For the appointment of the wardens listed below, see RPS, record 1481/4/3
(Angus, 1481); ER, VIII, 208; RMS, II, no. 1418, p. 292 (Buchan, 1474, 1479); RPS, record A1482/3/1
(Darnley, 1482).
26 Patrick Hepburn of Dunsyre (to succeed as second Lord Hailes in 1482-1483) was keeper of Berwick
Citadel from January to August 1482; ER, IX, preface, xlii, 433, and Macdougall, James III (1982),
158-68. David Hume of Godscroft (1558-1629x31), seems to have been the first to attribute the
sobriquet to the 5th earl of Angus, in his History of the Houses of Douglas and Angus.
27 RPS, record 1482/3/44. In the previous year, Tantallon, Dunglass, Hailes, Hume, and Edrington had
been singled out in the east (RPS, record 1481/4/9).
28 For Jedburgh’s towers in 1523, see Henry VIII, Letters, III, ii, no. 3364, pp. 1399-1400. Cf. the ports
and walls of Peebles, mentioned in 1468: Peebles Chrs., 157.
29 RPS, record 1482/3/44.
30 Hermitage and Lochmaben had been singled out in 1481 (RPS, record 1481/4/9).
Annan, and of twenty at “Bellis Toure” (Bell’s Tower), the latter being apparently
Kirkconnel Tower, now Springkell, in Annandale.31
The numbers provided for each fortification were not large, and the leading his-
torian of the period has colourfully dismissed them as “pitiful [. . .] penny numbers,”
worthless against the invading army.32 It is true that the extra ten archers and ten
spearmen sent to Blackadder would have made scant difference in the path of thou-
sands of Englishmen, and during the invasion, the fortalice, house, barmekin, orchard,
yard, and park of Blackadder were destroyed.33 Nevertheless, it should be made clear
that the numbers provided were not totals but, in all probability, additions to exist-
ing private forces. What is more, the size and strength of the Scottish garrisons were
comparable to their English counterparts. For example, Norham Castle was gar-
risoned with a minimum of thirty men in March 1482. A century earlier, English-held
Lochmaben had been defended with twenty men-at-arms and forty archers, fewer than
the garrison of one hundred for which Closeburn was now being paid.34 Numbers in
this range were considered adequate to equip border castles and less spacious tow-
ers. Only at major centres like Berwick or Carlisle were great investments of manpower
ever made, by either side.35 In the end, Gloucester used a force of 1,700 men to cap-
ture the citadel of Berwick.36
Long-standing Scottish strategic policy was to deny England its military advan-
tages. In part this meant that major castles were demolished once captured (like Jed-
burgh in 1409 and Roxburgh in 1460) in order to forestall English re-occupation.37
In 1482, with the glaring exception of Berwick in the east, so personally important
Local Society and the Defence of the English Frontier in Fifteenth-Century Scotland 135
31 RPS, record 1482/3/44. For the Bells of Kirkconnel, see RMS, II, no. 85, p. 16 (1409); NAS: AD 1/81
(1495). However, it is also possible that this tower was Kirkconnell, at the mouth of the Nith (Fraser,
The Book of Carlaverock, no. 43, pp. 435-36). Another Kirkconnel is in upper Nithsdale, near San-
quhar. See also Gifford, The Buildings of Scotland: Dumfries and Galloway, 364-67, 525-26.
32 Macdougall, James III (1982), 154.
33 ADC, II, 305; Acta Concilii (Stair), nos. 218, 583, pp. 53, 153. A barmekin is an outer wall enclosing
a tower, affording protection to livestock from raiders.
34 Macdonald, Border Bloodshed, 76.
35 Raine, North Durham, 10-11. For other English garrisons, see PPC, I, 124-26; PPC, II, 145-48, 338-
39; CDS, IV, nos. 567-68, pp. 118-19; Goodman, “The Defence,” 163-65; Summerson, Medieval
Carlisle, I, 311, 320, and “Carlisle and the English West March,” 97-99; King, “‘Pur Salvation du
Roiaume’,” 18-19.
36 Macdougall, James III (1982), 169.
37 Grant, Independence and Nationhood, 33-35, and “Richard III and Scotland,” 116-17. This strategy
had also been applied in the twelfth century; see Strickland, “Securing the North,” 188.
to James III, and the royal castle of Lochmaben in the west, Scottish strategy was
focused on augmenting a thinly spread line of smaller private fortalices. For instance,
the king’s castles of Newark, in Ettrick Forest, and Dunbar, on the Lothian coast,
were not mentioned.38 This chain of augmented fortifications was almost entirely
within nine miles (14.5 km) of the border. Only Cocklaw at 10.6 miles (17 km),
Castlemilk at 13.7 miles (22 km), and Lochmaben at 18 miles (29 km) were beyond
this distance.39 English evidence reinforces the impression given here that only a nar-
row strip of territory, perhaps not deeper than twelve miles (19.3 km) from the bor-
der line, was ever given major consideration by either side in preparation for defence
against attack by land.40
The Scottish arrangements of 1482 should not be seen as a futile effort to stop
the English army. Instead, they are best understood as an attempt to put up a net-
work of defences against relatively smaller chevauchées that might precede, accom-
pany, or follow the invasion — the sort of hit-and-run raiding most famously
practised in the days of Robert I.41 Major invasions were rare in the fifteenth-cen-
tury marches, but organized raiding was a regular occurrence during periods of
diplomatic breakdown. In 1480, the earl of Angus had led such an assault on Bam-
burgh, and the earl of Northumberland had raided Roxburghshire, the latter with
such success that he paused on the mains of Cessford to dub to knighthood mem-
bers of his retinue.42 Exactly this sort of smaller incursion could be countered
effectively by armed men distributed at points close to the frontier. If these ready
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38 Patrick Murray of Fallahill was royal keeper of Newark in 1479 and 1482 (ER, IX, 31, 137, 184).
Lochmaben and Dunbar had been singled out in 1481 (RPS, record 1481/4/9), when John Murray
of Touchadam was keeper of the latter (ER, IX, preface, liv, 431).
39 Moving east to west, rounded approximate distances are: Blackadder (4 miles / 7 km), Wedderburn
(6 miles / 10 km), Hume (6 miles / 10 km), Cessford (7 miles / 11 km), Ormiston (8 miles / 13 km),
Cocklaw (11 miles / 17 km), Edgerston (3 miles / 5 km), Jedburgh (9 miles / 14 km), Dolphinston
(5 miles / 9 km), Hermitage (6 miles / 10 km), Lochmaben (18 miles / 29 km), Castlemilk (14 miles /
22 km), Annan (9 miles / 14 km), Bell’s Tower/Kirkconnel (7 miles / 11 km). Amisfield (24 miles /
39 km) and Closeburn (31 miles / 50 km) were both further up Nithsdale.
40 CDS, IV, no. 286, p. 62; CPR 1377-81, 455; Hardyng, Chronicle, 373; Goodman,“The Defence,” 167;
Lomas,“The Impact of Border Warfare,” 149, 159, 163-64, 167; King,“‘Pur Salvation du Roiaume’,”
15.
41 On Bruce’s tactics, see Scammell, “Robert I,” 385-403; McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces, 72-122;
Grant, Independence and Nationhood, 33-35; and Brown, The Wars of Scotland, 211-12, 216, 221.
42 Macdougall, James III (1982), App. A, p. 311 (“The Short Chronicle of 1482,” from London, British
Library, Royal MS 17 DXX, fols. 299-398); Metcalfe, A Book of Knights, 6.
reinforcements caused a light cavalry normally in private retinues to become avail-
able, such mobile forces would also have been able to respond to a raiding party.
This interpretation of the Scottish objectives is reinforced by the provision that
larger units, of two hundred men at Berwick and one hundred at Hermitage, were
to be flexibly deployed as needed. Indeed, from limited evidence it seems probable
that in late May 1482 the duke of Gloucester led just such an incursion into south-
west Scotland, burning Dumfries and forty-four other unnamed towns and villages.
Records shed no further light on the extent of the attack or the response, but, if it
in fact occurred at this time, then several of the western garrisons ordered by
parliament almost certainly earned their wages in meeting and driving out the
English raiders.43
The question of leadership is vital to an understanding of the war measures of
1482. If raising an army was an established means of asserting royal authority and com-
pelling practical service from subjects of all ranks, then James III failed dismally, even
in the defence of the realm. The springtime parliament in which these defensive
arrangements were laid down was not controlled by the king but by those who were
soon to sideline him at Lauder during the July invasion. The twelve-member Com-
mittee of the Articles, which set the parliamentary agenda, included all three wardens
(Angus, Buchan, and Darnley), the earl of Huntly, and four others later involved in
or associated with the Lauder affair.44 Of the different analyses of the conspiracy,
Roland Tanner’s emphasis on the Lords of the Articles as the main party influencing
the challenge to the king at Lauder is most compelling for the purposes of this study.
It does not conflict with Norman Macdougall’s view that the chief conspirator was
Buchan, one of the king’s half-uncles, or with his view that the conspirators’ motives
were to control a dangerous king and avert a potential military disaster.45 Recent
events gave particular cause for concern. In 1479, James III had exiled his own brother
Alexander, duke of Albany, and in the following year, he had seen to the death of his
other brother John, earl of Mar. Albany’s elimination provoked serious turbulence in
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43 See Ross, Edward IV, 287 n. 3, and sources cited therein; CDS, IV, App. 1, no. 31, pp. 415-16 (letter
of c.1482).
44 RPS, record 1482/3/3. On royal leadership, cf. Curry, Agincourt, 64.
45 Macdougall, James III (1982), 128-33, 165-67, and “‘It is I, the Earle of Mar’,” 44; Tanner, “‘I Arest
You, Sir’,” 114-17. Boardman’s view of a coup from within the royal household may still be consis-
tent with Tanner if Buchan ‘turned’ disgruntled senior household members before Lauder; Board-
man, The Campbells, 217-18.
the marches.46 This was a volatile and defensive king with a track record for rash
decisions, and his fixation on the possession of Berwick was a potential liability.47
It seems probable that the wardens themselves, all members of the Committee of
the Articles, drafted the war measures and put them before the parliament. Darnley
was newly appointed to the office; in fact, the parliament of 1482 appointed him to
the west march in place of the king’s associate, Alan, Lord Cathcart. Angus, now the
dominant magnate in the south-east and also lord of Liddesdale, had been warden
of the east march for a year.48 Buchan, however, had two decades of experience in
Anglo-Scottish diplomacy and had been warden of the middle march since the early
1470s.49 It was these three men who were left to make realistic plans in the face of the
expected invasion. Open battle such as the king seemed eager to seek was uncertain
and risky,50 and military commanders across medieval Europe were reluctant to
engage in it unless circumstances weighed heavily in their favour. Avoiding full-scale
engagement with English armies had been part of Scottish strategy for centuries,51 and
the cost of defeat — most recently the English loss at the Sark in 1448 and the even
more devastating Scottish loss at Humbleton Hill in 1402 — doubtless loomed in
the collective memory. In order to face these risks, a commander’s basic necessity
was the trust and confidence of his followers.52 James III had lost these, and the unity
of his subjects, especially in the marches, had been undermined by Albany’s removal.
The worst possible scenario was for the king to lead the Scottish host to defeat in a
vain attempt to relieve Berwick. In all probability, Buchan and the other wardens
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49 Boardman, “Stewart, James, earl of Buchan.”
50 James III appears to have insisted that, should Edward IV invade in person, then he was to resist him
in person “withe the hale body of the realme to leyf and dee with his hienes in his defence”: RPS,
record 1482/3/44.
51 See Strickland, “Securing the North,” and esp. the literature cited by him at 178 n. 5. See also Prest-
wich, Armies and Warfare, 186 and 198.
52 Cf. Phillips, “Strategy and Its Limitations,” 396-97; Jones, “The Battle of Verneuil,” 375-411.
already envisioned that an arrest of the king might become necessary. However, their
immediate difficulty was in setting out a plan for defence that would keep the king
content, be of practical value, and allow for a ‘soft’ coup if needed.
For the king’s part, the three estates allowed him to spend his own money on the
defence of Berwick. For a more practical plan of flexible defence against frontier raid-
ing, especially if this conflicted with the king’s emphasis on Berwick, the wardens
indubitably sought wider support for their proposals than they might otherwise have
felt necessary. They might also have valued parliamentary endorsement if they antici-
pated the need to move against the king. Certainly, Buchan and John, earl of Atholl
(also one of the king’s half-uncles and also to become embroiled in the aftermath of
Lauder), saw fit to secure a remission during the same parliament for having seized
Edinburgh Castle earlier in the reign.53
A scattering of border lords came to the spring parliament, but none of these
attendees had a direct role in the defensive plans.54 Just one of the six appointed cap-
tains, John Cranstoun of that Ilk, was present. He was a Roxburghshire laird and the
royal bailie of Ettrick Forest.55 All of the other captains had similar interests in the
marches. Kirkpatrick of Closeburn and Charteris of Amisfield were Dumfriesshire
lairds.56 Edmonstone and Borthwick were primarily based in Edinburghshire but
also had lands in the borders, and both had a history of march service.57 Even the
Lanarkshire knight who was given command at Angus’s castle of Hermitage, Baillie
of Lamington, had older lands at Hoprig in eastern Lothian and armorial links to
the ancient Dunbar earls of March.58 The wardens seem to have selected these men
as captains not only because they could offer effective leadership but because they could
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Robert, Lord Maxwell; George, Lord Haliburton; William, Lord Borthwick; and William Douglas
of Drumlanrig.
55 For Cranstoun, see HMC, 7th Report, app., part II, nos. 9, 10, 12, p. 728; RPS, record 1479/3/17; ER,
IX, 162, 552; X, 245-46.
56 For Closeburn, see RMS, II, no. 1007, p. 208. For Amisfield, see ADC, I, 95*; RPS, records 1484/2/76,
136.
57 For Edmonstone of that Ilk and Ednam, see RMS, II, nos. 61, 1644, pp. 11-12, 346; RPS, records
1482/12/19, 1483/10/74. For Borthwick, see ER, IV, 115, 224; IX, 317; RMS, I, no. 7, p. 246; II, nos.
650, 667, 937, 1130, pp. 143, 145-46, 195, 231.
58 For Baillie of Lamington and Hoprig, see RPS, record 1472/23; RMS, II, no. 2187, p. 461; Clouston,
“The Armorial de Berry,” 97.
be trusted to work together and, at least tacitly, to allow the restraint of the king.
Indeed, Borthwick’s father, Lord Borthwick, was among those involved in the king’s
captivity in Edinburgh after Lauder.59
For the actual defensive plans to work, the wardens’ chosen captains needed to
command the resources of border society that were already in place, and it is here that
the importance of local networks is apparent. This required close cooperation among
all those who were involved. Each captain (except for Closeburn and Lamington)
was instructed to choose two deputes. No evidence survives to show who was selected,
but it stands to reason that the private owners of the fortalices which the captains were
sent to command naturally filled these roles. This would result in some displace-
ment. For example, at Hume Castle, Borthwick would have temporarily moved in
with Lord Hume and his adult grandson, the proprietors. At their own residences,
George Hume of Wedderburn and Andrew Blackadder of that Ilk would probably have
acted as Borthwick’s deputes. The Humes, engaged in their own private struggle with
the king at this time, were not at parliament either, and would have been just the sort
of potentially sympathetic candidates the wardens wanted on their side.60 As it hap-
pened, the day before the seizure of the king, the Humes were in attendance on the
earl of Huntly at Redpath, only 8.4 miles (13.5 km) from Lauder. At that meeting, the
younger Hume gave his bond of manrent to Huntly (who was himself implicated in
the coup) in exchange for land and continued private office.61
Local cooperation was equally necessary in the other marches. In order to facili-
tate this, networks of kin, friends, and allies were harnessed. In the middle march,
Edmonstone, as an appointed captain, would have had to come to an arrangement
with Andrew Ormiston of that Ilk62 and with two lairds whose families were linked
by multiple marriages about this time, Walter Kerr of Cessford and James Rutherford
of that Ilk, laird of Edgerston.63 Also in this march, Cranstoun (another captain)
regularly rendered the account for Jedburgh to the exchequer, and local deed trans-
actions show that he was already very familiar with the Gladstones of Cocklaw and
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61 HMC, 12th Report, app., part VIII, no. 169, pp. 138-39. See also Macdougall,“‘It is I, the Earle of Mar’,”
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62 For Ormiston and his son Robert, see RMS, II, nos. 792, 1057, 1523, pp. 169-70, 219, 318-19.
63 SP, VII, 330-31; ER, IX, 660; RMS, II, nos. 1511, 2121, pp. 316, 448-49.
the Ainslies of Dolphinston. He may well have chosen to base himself in the burgh,
leaving his two lairdly deputes at their own residences.64 Still other conjugal bonds
are detectable among these families. By the mid-1480s, the Ainslies were joined to the
Kerrs, and the Blackadders to the Edmonstones. In the next decade, the latter family
were also to intermarry with the Humes of Wedderburn.65 In the sphere of Anglo-
Scottish diplomacy, many of these middle march lairds of the early 1480s had shared
minor roles with their east march counterparts in the mid-1470s.66
In Angus’s own Hermitage Castle in Liddesdale, where one hundred men were to
be placed under the command of Sir William Baillie of Lamington, the latter would
have taken up quarters with the earl’s incumbent keeper and brother-in-law, David Scott
of Buccleuch. The Scotts, Humes, and Kerrs can all be linked at this time in a network
closely associated with Angus. At some point before 1494, a Hume marriage tied Lam-
ington into this nexus, too.67 However, the extent of local control which these men
commanded may have been seriously limited. Indirect evidence suggests that during
1482 Lamington and Scott had trouble with lesser lairds in the lordship, for certain
Elwalds became rebels and, in November, Angus confiscated Thomas Armstrong of
Mangerton’s lands, re-granting them to Buccleuch. It is plausible that some of the
Armstrongs and Elwalds had intrigued with Englishmen under the noses of Laming-
ton and Buccleuch, thus provoking the earl’s wrath.68 The incentive was there for them
to do so: in the previous year, Edward IV had promised rewards to Scottish turncoats,
and in the spring parliament of 1482, James III extended a pardon to all borderers
who had committed treason, bar those who had become sworn Englishmen.69
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69 CDS, IV, no. 1470, pp. 299-300; RPS, record 1482/3/44.
The local power to be reckoned with in Lord Darnley’s west march wardenry
was Robert, Lord Maxwell, of Carlaverock Castle. Darnley’s widowed mother had
taken Maxwell’s father as her second husband and, as a result, these two lords shared
five half-brothers. A list of Darnley’s following in Edinburgh Castle, exonerated in
October 1482 for their part in the royal detention, includes four Maxwells, three of
whom were probably his half-brothers. Lord Maxwell himself attended the spring
parliament and so at least would have had a say in Darnley’s appointment as warden,
and he was probably also consulted about the war measures. By 25 March 1482 at the
latest, Maxwell’s son and heir, Sir John, became the Crown’s steward of the lordship
of Annandale, which Albany had forfeited three years earlier. Kirkpatrick of Close-
burn, as captain, was given his command at Lochmaben in the heart of Maxwell ter-
ritory, for Annandale was centred on this castle.70
The final captain, Charteris of Amisfield, probably based himself in the small
town of Annan (a burgh of barony within Annandale) and elected as his deputes
William Stewart of Castlemilk and Bell of Kirkconnel to command their own strong-
holds.71 Amisfield had received the manrent of one of Closeburn’s kinsmen sometime
before 1484, and both these lairds soon proved to be Maxwell allies when Lord
Maxwell, and his son and grandson, came into strife with another west march fam-
ily, the Murrays of Cockpool.72 As warden in this march, Darnley might have expected
to be able to call on the support of another kinsman, Castlemilk, for both were closely
related cadets of the Stewart family. For that matter, even Angus was a Stewart descen-
dant, of the Bonkyll house.
All these inter-connections show how frontier society prepared to shield itself. Such
ties of lordship, kinship, and friendship were the bedrock of border defence. Even
when the Scottish parliament took the unusual step of making highly specific ordi-
nances for war, these relied heavily on private networks of power. At the top of these
overlapping groups were the wardens, whose role was to harness and direct them. It
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should be expected that the sixteen landowners named or implicated in the parlia-
mentary ordinances represent only a fraction of the total network to be called into
action from the beginning of May, albeit the fraction most important to the war-
dens. At least Angus and Darnley can be seen to be linked very closely to these local
lairds. By contrast, Buchan is not so clearly associated with this milieu. Although he
purchased the fortified house of Traquair in eastern Peeblesshire in 1478, and engaged
in a long-standing liaison with a kinswoman of the border Murrays, he cannot other-
wise be shown to be active in local affairs. If he was the most probable leader of the
Lauder coup, as Macdougall suggests, then he appears to have depended heavily on
the support of Angus’s and Darnley’s followings for backing in the marches.73
The best-documented episode of border defence in the fifteenth century also
illustrates that, despite James III’s predilections, Scottish military strategy was not
based on the establishment of garrisons in royal castles or on the concentration of
forces to resist a single attack. Rather, the main objective was entirely pragmatic: to
reinforce an organized defensive chain of smaller private fortalices along the frontier
which were able to respond flexibly to repel the cross-border raids that were expected
to coincide with the enemy’s main assault. Insofar as the main assault was unavoid-
able, so was the risk of the loss of Berwick. But when the invading army returned
across the border, the overall defensive integrity of the southern marches remained
intact.
Of course, the big question is whether, given that they were innovative and excep-
tional, the war measures of 1482 should be dismissed as unrepresentative of Scottish
arrangements for defence. Their real innovation was the payment of troops by the gov-
ernment. There is no reason to assume that the aim of this expenditure — to rein-
force existing private garrisons linked by local social bonds — shows anything extraor-
dinary. The wardens, sitting on the Committee of the Articles, had no cause to overturn
time-tested strategy. In fact, if they were considering the need for a possible arrest of
the king, as seems likely, then they should have been even more eager to trust in long-
standing practice. Thus, it can be inferred that the mobilization of local networks to
resist cross-border raiding, relying especially on private garrisons in towers close to
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the border, was a rehearsal of familiar procedure. But this was familiar not because
it looked like the major wartime operations conducted under the first Bruce king
and his heir, or indeed under the first Stewart king and his heir. Rather, it would seem
that what was being rehearsed was a defensive response to raiding of the sort that
had afflicted the borderlands for nearly two centuries, not just in wartime but in
times of unstable truce: it was now being augmented and applied with central co-
ordination to defend the length of the border when a major warlike threat emerged.74
The Scottish marches towards England were not an isolated and peripheral
province in the later fifteenth century. Even in the west march, the lesser nobles of the
region were directly linked to those holding the reins of power at the highest levels.75
When it counted most — when a foreign invader was expected — border landown-
ers were ready to cooperate with greater lords and the central government in the
defence of the realm. What is more, the wardens’ networks that reached into the bor-
der localities were ready to support their leaders in sidelining a volatile king in time
of war. As the news of the coup of 22 July spread from Lauder, most of the lairds
mentioned above were probably not taken by complete surprise. By 1 August, when
the paid garrisons disbanded and as the common tenantry returned home from the
muster, the border lairds’ practical concerns doubtless remained unchanged. With
an ear to the events unfolding at Edinburgh, now more than ever the governmental
‘core’ of the kingdom, they would continue to rely on groups of kin, friends, and
lords to guard the marches against raiders.76
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